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SUPERVISION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS
IN OHIO
THE OHIO CHARITABLE TRUSTS ACT
By RALPH KLAPP* AND NEVA H. WERTZ*"
I. THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT
It is, perhaps, essential that the purpose of any legislative enactment
must be that which is evident in the legislation itself; to go beyond the
exact statutory provision is to open the door to a conclusion which may
be influenced by the subjective thinking of the writers. The need for
charitable trust legislation and the purpose to be accomplished by it
would of necessity receive varying interpretations from those associated
in different capacities with the duties of enforcing, restraining the abuse
of, and administering charitable trusts. Nevertheless, it seems impossible
to attempt any evaluation of the Charitable Trusts Act' without first
taking a backward glance toward the situation which in fact existed prior
to October 14, 1953, when the Act became effective. The Attorney
General was then, as now, the public officer charged with the duty of
protecting and enforcing charitable trusts. This duty was an inherent
one under the common law, but more than that, the General Assembly
of Ohio had as early as 18522 specifically enjoined upon the Attorney
General the duty of enforcing the performance of trusts for charitable
and educational purposes. This continued to be a statutory duty of the
chief legal officer of the state; Ohio General Code §340 [Ohio Rev.
Code §109.11 (1953)], contained this mandatory language:
The attorney-general shall cause a proper action to be
instituted to enforce the performance of a trust for charitable
and educational purposes, and to restrain the abuse thereof,
if he deems such action advisable, * * *.
The fundamental problem was not a lack of the necessary au-
thority to take affirmative action to enforce charitable trusts and to re-
strain their abuse; it was rather the lack of sufficient information to
make it possible to take any active leadership in enforcing and protecting
these trusts. As was said by the then Attorney General, C. William
O'Neill,3 in referring to the lack of activity of his office in the charitable
trust field:
This failure to protect is clearly not the result of choice
on the part of our office, nor the result of negligence. It is a
OA.B., Wittenberg College; J.D., Ohio State University College of Law;
member of Ohio Bar; Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Charitable
Trust Division.
00 B.S., Ohio State University; LL.B., Franklin University; member of Ohio
Bar; Assistant Attorney General assigned to the Charitable Trust Division.
1 Ohio Rev. Code §§109.23-33 (1953).
250 Ohio Laws 267.
3 Address before the Montgomery County Bar Association, March 3, 1953.
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simple case of clearly defining the duty, the objective-but
neglecting totally the means of accomplishment. It is like
ordering the Governor to fly to the moon.
Ohio was certainly not unique in this dilemma. Professor Scott
has this to say:4
In the United States we have lagged far behind Eng-
land in the matter of the supervision of the administration of
charitable trusts. As in England in the middle of the nine-
teenth century, the enforcement of charitable trusts is left to
the more or less sporadic action of the Attorney General. In
most of the states there is no officer who is charged with the
duty of exercising any general supervision over the administra-
tion of charitable trusts, and no one knows how much property
is held upon such trusts or to what extent they are being
properly administered. In a few states there are statutes which
provide that trustees for charitable purposes must account an-
nually to the court. More recently statutes have been enacted
in several states, led by New Hampshire, reorganizing the
office of the Attorney General so as to enable him to deal
more effectively with the supervision and enforcement of
charitable trusts. 5
Professor Bogert also refers to the growing recognition that the
Attorneys General of the several states are handicapped in their duties
by the dearth of information regarding charitable trusts and mentions
the rather few jurisdictions which have taken effective steps toward
correcting this situation by legislation.' The problem of supervision of
charitable trusts received attention from The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which, at its meeting in 1954,
approved and recommended an act for the uniform supervision of
charitable trusts.7
Thus, the enactment of the Charitable Trusts Act placed Ohio
among the relatively few states which have recognized the need for
supervision of charitable trusts and have taken effective action toward
making such supervision an actuality. Ohio, by this legislation, joined
with those states pioneering in the field of establishing a constructive and
workable plan designed for the greater protection of the vast amount of
wealth devoted to public charitable purposes by means of the charitable
4 Scott, Trusts §391, p. 2755 (2nd Ed.)
5 Professor Scott refers in a footnote to the laws in force in New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Ohio, New York, Idaho, South Carolina and Cali-
fornia, relating to charitable trusts or charitable corporations and to the Uniform
Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act, adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1954.
6 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, §441, p. 266.
7 Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act, Handbook
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1954,
pages 100, 169.
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trust. Let us turn now to the Act itself to consider from an objective
point of view its exact purposes.
A. Charitable Funds to which the Act Applies
The definition section of the Act,8 which describes in some detail
the scope of the Act, reads as follows:
As used in sections 109.23 to 109.33, inclusive of the
of the Revised Code, 'charitable trust' means any fiduciary
relationship with respect to property arising as a result of a
manifestation of intention to create it, and subjecting the
partnership, corporation, person, or association of persons by
whom the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the
property for any charitable, religious or educational purpose.
There are excluded from this definition and from the operation
of such sections, trusts until such time as the charitable,
religious or educational purpose expressed in such trust becomes
vested in use or enjoyment. Such sections do not apply to
charitable, religious and educational institutions holding funds
in trust or otherwise exclusively for their own purposes nor to
institutions created and operated as agencies of the state
government or any political subdivision thereof.
It can thus readily be seen that the Act is not all-inclusive; vast
amounts of property which are, in fact, devoted to charitable uses by
means of gifts to charitable corporations exclusively for a corporate
purpose are excluded from the requirements of the Act, as are those
trusts which are ultimately to be used for charitable purposes, but which,
by the terms of the trust instrument, have no part of the trust income
or property presently being devoted to any charitable use.
B. Discovery of Charitable Trusts and Current
Information Reflecting Administration
It has been pointed out earlier in this discussion that prior to the
enactment of the Charitable Trusts Act the Attorney General was
severely handicapped in carrying out his duties relating to charitable
trusts by his complete lack of knowledge of their existence. It is in-
conceivable that any efficient or sustained program could be developed
to enforce charitable trusts and thereby protect the public for whom
their benefits were intended without there being some plan for making
information available to the person charged with the enforcement duty.
It is apparent that the General Assembly directed its intention toward
this need.
Trustees are now required to register charitable trusts with the
Attorney General upon forms prescribed by that official for this pur-
pose,9 and probate courts are required to notify the Attorney General
immediately after the probate of any will which creates or purports to
create a charitable trust.
10
8 Ohio Rev. Code §109.23 (1953).
9 Ohio Rev. Code §109.26 (1953).
11) Ohio Rev. Code §109.30 (1953).
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It is then made a duty of every trustee of a charitable trust to file
a biennial report with the Attorney General, such report to reflect not
only the property held in trust but also the receipts and expenditures
during the period and any other information required by the Attorney
General."
These statutory requirements, when read together, make it plain
that the legislature intended that the Attorney General should have
available not only the basic information concerning the existence of all
charitable trusts but also current information, to be brought to date each
two years, concerning the actual administration of such trusts. There
are additional methods of discovery provided by the further directions
to judges of the courts of probate and common pleas to furnish to the
Attorney General such copies of papers and such information as to
records and files relating to charitable trusts as the Attorney General
may require,12 and the requirement that the Auditor of State, when
requested to do so by the Attorney General, shall make investigations
and audits required in the enforcement of charitable trusts. 3 In addi-
tion to these mandatory provisions which bring to the office of the
Attorney General information regarding charitable trusts, the General
Assembly granted further power in this area when it provided that the
Attorney General may make such rules and regulations as are deemed
necessary to secure records and other information for the charitable
trust register.'
4
C. Enforcement
The new Charitable Trusts Act imposes upon the Attorney General
the duty to enforce charitable trusts and to restrain their abuse whenever
he believes it advisable to do so or when directed so to do by the Gover-
nor, the Supreme Court, the General Assembly or either house thereof. 15
This particular provision is substantially similar to former Ohio General
Code §340.
The Act now, however, makes the Attorney General a necessary
party and provides that he must be served with process or with summons
by registered mail in all proceedings which have as their objects the
following:' 6 "(1) To terminate a charitable trust or to distribute its
assets to other than charitable donees, or (2) To depart from the objects
or purposes of a charitable trust as the same are set forth in the in-
strument creating the trust, including any proceeding for the application
of the doctrine of cy pres, or (3) To construe the provisions of an
instrument with respect to a charitable trust." This section then ex-
pressly makes void and unenforceable any judgment rendered in such
11 Ohio Rev. Code §109.31 (1953).
12 Ohio Rev. Code §109.29 (1953).
13 Ohio Rev. Code §109.32 (1953).
14 Ohio Rev. Code §109.27 (1953).
15 Ohio Rev. Code §109.24 (1953).
16 Ohio Rev. Code §109.25 (1953).
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proceedings without service of process having been made upon the At-
torney General and directs that such judgment shall be set aside upon
that official's motion for such relief.
By the same section, discretion is granted to the Attorney General
to intervene in any action affecting a charitable trust and the duty is
imposed upon him to intervene when the court having jurisdiction of the
action so requests. It is also now made necessary that he join in any
compromise, settlement agreement, contract or judgment modifying or
terminating a charitable trust in order that they may be valid, and he is
expressly empowered to enter into any such compromises, settlement
agreements, contracts or judgments which are for the public good.
There can be no doubt as to the purpose of this enactment. Too
often litigation concerning charitable trusts could be completed with the
official representing the public having no knowledge of the action, and,
of course, having no part in the litigation; any such action would now
be a nullity and could be set aside. It is, perhaps, entirely safe to say
that in cases in which an attack was being made upon a charitable trust,
this was always true in the spirit, but not in the letter, of the law, and
was only too often overlooked.
II. OPERATION OF OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
OFFICE IN ADMINISTERING THE ACT
The office of the Attorney General has established a division of
charitable trusts under the direction of an Assistant Attorney General.
This division is charged with the responsibility of establishing and main-
taining the register of charitable trusts, examining from both a legal and
an accounting viewpoint the biennial accounts filed with the division,
counselling attorneys, trust officers, trustees, donors, and current benefici-
aries of charitable trusts regarding trust problems, and taking active part
in litigation regarding charitable trusts.
One of the immediate problems which confronted this charitable
trust division upon the effective date of the Act was to devise a plan to
assist in bringing this legislation to the attention of lawyers and trust
companies throughout Ohio. A one-page bulletin summarizing the re-
quirements of the Act was, therefore, prepared and forwarded at that
time to members of the bar and to trust companies directing attention to
the Act.
The registration requirement of the Charitable Trusts Act"r was
an innovation in Ohio law; it was, then, not surprising that it was toward
this section of the Act that the Attorney General, trustees, members of
the bar, and trust officers primarily directed their attention. At that time
a major function of the charitable trust division was the actual registra-
tion of charitable trusts, necessarily precedent to which was the prepa-
ration of a suitable form on which such registrations should be made.
During the last three months of 1953 and the entire year of 1954,
17 Ohio Rev. Code §109.26 (1953).
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the examination and registration of charitable trusts was one of the
major functions of this division. It was, of course, during this period
that the larger part of the total trust registrations were received; by the
end of 1954 there had been a total of 734 trusts registered, with an
approximate total value of $204,161,008. As of December 31, 1956,
there had been registered 910 trusts with an approximate value in excess
of $224,000,000. There is, of course, no way of having information
as to whether there is still a backlog of such trusts which have not as yet
been registered.
The registration blank prescribed by the Attorney General is a
rather simple, one-page form designed to secure pertinent information
concerning the creation and administration of a charitable trust, in-
cluding the following: the name of the donor; the method by which it
was created, whether by will or by an inter vivos trust agreement; the
approximate value of the corpus; investments held; investment provisions
in the trust instrument; and the general charitable purpose or purposes
for which the trust was created, including the identity and interest of any
definite current charitable beneficiary.
The actual preparation and maintenance of the register of charita-
ble trusts is largely a mechanical operation, as is the registration of in-
dividual trusts as they are submitted by trustees. The register itself is a
simple numerical file, with each trust being assigned a permanent file
number; a cross-index system is used, with the trusts indexed both by
the name of the donor and the trustee. The registration file of any
particular trust consists basically of the registration form executed by the
trustee and a copy of the trust instrument. Upon receipt of any trust
submitted for registration, both the trust instrument and the registration
form are examined, and the trustee is then notified of the file number
assigned to the trust.
The actual registration of the trust is, however, only the initial step
in maintaining the charitable trust register. Subsequent to the registra-
tion, there is the required biennial report which must be filed by the
trustee. These reports must be and are audited by the division of chari-
table trusts; the list of investments is examined to determine whether
or not they are permissible within the language of the trust instrument;
and the distribution of funds must be analyzed with a view to the ex-
pressed directions of the donor.
Another function of the charitable trust division of this office
during the early months of administering this Act was the examination
of many specific trust instruments or articles of incorporation of charita-
ble corporations to determine, and to advise those from whom the in-
quiries were received, whether the trust or corporation fell within the
definition in Ohio Rev. Code §109.23 (1953), so as to require registra-
tion.
Attention should now be directed toward Ohio Rev. Code § 109.25
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(1953),"8 which has made it mandatory to join the Attorney General
as a party litigant in many actions affecting charitable trusts. It is, per-
haps, true that prior to the enactment of the Charitable Trusts Act, the
Attorney General, because of his inherent power and duty to protect and
enforce charitable trusts, should have been a party in many such actions.
Usually, however, he received no notice and had no knowledge of the
pending action, and the litigation would be completed without this repre-
sentation of the public interest. This is, of course, no longer the case;
the volume of litigation in which the Attorney General has been joined
as a party defendant has, as anticipated, increased considerably since
Section 109.25, Revised Code, became effective; the Attorney General
was named a party defendant in more than 30 new actions initiated in
each of the years of 1955 and 1956, in approximately 25 in 1954, and
14 in 1953; prior to 1953 such cases were rather infrequently brought
to the attention of the Attorney General. This, it is suggested, indicates
clearly that both the courts and members of the bar are now aware of
the role of the Attorney General in protecting and enforcing charitable
trusts and the statutory mandate that he must be made a party in actions
affecting charitable trusts.
The types of litigation in which the Attorney General has been
joined as a party defendant have been quite varied, but perhaps the types
most frequently recurring are those for will construction or declaratory
judgment, or both. While many of these are actions by executors or
18 Ohio Rev. Code §109.25 (1953) reads as follows:
The attorney general shall be a necessary party to and shall be
served with process or with summons by registered mail in all pro-
ceedings, the object of which is: (1) To terminate a charitable trust
or to distribute its assets to other than charitable donees, or (2) To
depart from the objects or purposes of a charitable trust as the same
are set forth in the instrument creating the trust, including any pro-
ceeding for the application of the doctrine of cy press, or (3) To con-
strue the provisions of an instrument with respect to a charitable trust.
A judgment rendered in such proceedings without service of process
upon the attorney general shall be void, unenforceable, and shall be set
aside upon the attorney general's motion seeking such relief. The
attorney general shall intervene in any proceeding affecting a charita-
ble trust when requested to do so by the court having jurisdiction of
the proceeding, and may intervene in any proceeding affecting a chari-
table trust when he determines that the public interest should be
protected in such proceeding. No compromise, settlement agreement,
contract or judgment agreed to by any or all parties having or claiming-
to have an interest in any charitable trust shall be valid if the com-
promise, settlement agreement, contract or judgment modifies or termi-
nates a charitable trust unless the attorney general was made a party
to all such proceedings and joined in said compromise, settlement agree-
ment, contract or judgment; provided, however, that the attorney
general is expressly authorized to enter into such compromise, settlement
agreements, contracts or judgments as may be in the best interests of
the public.
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trustees for court interpretation of instruments which are, under existing
circumstances, ambiguous in some respect or in which changing condi-
tions have made necessary the application of the doctrines of cy pres or
deviation in order that a charitable gift may not fail in whole or in
part,19 some are in fact merely a device for making an outright attack
upon a trust instrument. In one such instance, in an action filed prior to
the enactment of the Charitable Trusts Act, a large fund was saved for
educational purposes from an attack by the heirs and by the prosecuting
attorney of the county, the latter claiming at least a partial escheat for
the benefit of the county school system.2" In another such case the sole
heir and residuary devisee and legatee, who was also a co-executor, made
a vigorous attack upon a will, claiming that a gift in trust with a
contingent charitable remainder had been adeemed. 2'
Among the many other kinds of actions in which the Attorney
General has been joined as a party defendant are these: will contests,
an action to set aside an ante-nuptial agreement,2 2 petitions to sell real
property, a proposed action to secure approval of investments prohibited
by the trust instrument, an action to secure interest at the legal rate on
a charitable gift for the time prior to its payment to the charitable
trustees, 23 disposition of the assets of charitable corporations,2 4 cases in
which a charitable gift was void because the will was executed within a
year of the death of the testator, and litigation in which a charitable
beneficiary sought to terminate a charitable trust and take the fund out-
right in lieu of receiving a relatively small annual income.2 5 This listing
and the few cases shown in the footnotes are intended to be merely repre-
sentative and not exclusive.
It would, obviously, be a vain procedure to join the Attorney
General as a party defendant if the interest of the public were not
vigorously represented. It has been the policy of the charitable trust
division to participate actively in litigation; briefs are prepared whenever
required by the court or it is believed that a brief would be helpful to
19 Cleveland Museum of Art. v. O'Neill, Attorney General, 72 Ohio L. Abs.
11 (1956) ; The Benjamin Rose Institute v. O'Neill, Attorney General, Probate
Court, Cuyahoga County, No. 525,896.
20Kingdom v. Casey, Probate Court, Ashtabula County, 72 Ohio L. Abs.
249 (1956), Court of Appeals of Ashtabula County, No. 517, Supreme Court
of Ohio, No. 34622-23, Motions to Certify overruled.
21 Bool v. Bool, 165 Ohio St. 262 (1956).
22 Dawson v. Stewart, Probate Court, Greene County, No. 7575.
2 3 In re Estate of Shanafelt, 164 Ohio St. 258 (1955).
24 In re Orthodox Jewish Orphans' Home of Cincinnati, Court of Common
Pleas of Hamilton County, No. A147040; The Grand River Institute v. O'Neill,
Attorney General, Common Pleas Court of Ashtabula County, No. 44-178. In the
latter action the Attorney General was joined as a party under both Ohio Rev.
Code §109.25 and §1702.49.
25 Sisters of Charity v. O'Neill, Attorney General, Probate Court, Hardin
County, No. 17665.
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the court. The charitable trust division also adheres strictly to the policy
of being represented at hearings on charitable trust matters.
Another major function of the Attorney General in administering
the Charitable Trusts Act has been that of informally counselling and
advising attorneys and trustees. This has included making decisions as
to the registration requirement of Ohio Rev. Code §109.26 (1953),
as defined and limited by the exceptions and exclusions in Ohio Rev.
Code §109.23 (1953), suggesting possible plans of procedure prior to
the actual filing of a petition, and advising counsel, after preliminary
research, of the position which the Attorney General must take in the
event specific litigation is initiated. It has at times been possible to resolve
some seemingly rather difficult problems through such consultation and
study, making it unnecessary to place upon the court the entire burden
of determining the proper method and plan of administering a specific
trust.
This discussion would not be complete without mentioning the
procedure followed in processing and auditing the biennial accounts filed
in accordance with Ohio Rev. Code §109.31 (1953). These are ex-
amined from both an accounting and a legal viewpoint and are then
placed with the documents making up the trust registration; each indi-
vidual trust file is marked to show the receipt of such written report, the
date of receipt and the period covered by the report.
No rules and regulations have been adopted by -the Attorney
General; it has been believed that this duty can be performed more
efficiently after greater experience has been gained in the administration
of the Act.
Ill. DEGREE OF COMPLIANCE AND ATTITUDE
TOWARD THE ACT
There is, perhaps, no way accurately to determine the degree of
compliance with the Charitable Trusts Act as an entirety. It is, how-
ever, possible to draw conclusions from the facts which are available.
There have, as mentioned hereinbefore, been 910 trusts registered
with the Attorney General. It is highly improbable that this number
represents all trusts which require registration in accordance with Ohio
Rev. Code §§109.23-33 (1953). It is apparent, however, that there is
no way in which this office may readily become informed as to the
existence of each charitable trust established or active in Ohio so that
a specific effort could be made to secure the registration of any indi-
vidual trust which does not as yet appear in the register.
It would, it is true, be possible as a research problem to examine
the records in various probate courts to determine which, if any, testa-
mentary charitable trusts falling within the definitive section of the
Charitable Trusts Act26 have not as yet been registered; this, however, is
not a workable solution. Any such information as to testamentary trusts
260hio Rev. Code §109.23 (1953).
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would, in any event, be of doubtful value in determining the degree of
compliance; there would remain a vast number of inter vivos trusts
about which no such information could be obtained. It seems, however,
that it may be assumed that any failure on the part of trustees to
register such trusts stems, in large part, at least, from lack of familiarity
with the Act; this can and must be at least partially corrected by a
further educational program carried on by the office of the Attorney
General. Such a plan is now under consideration.
Then, too, the General Assembly has, in the Act itself, provided
a means for transmitting to the Attorney General from the probate
courts information concerning charitable trusts created by wills currently
admitted to probate."
It is believed that the Attorney General has been joined as a party
defendant in substantially all cases affecting charitable trusts, as set
forth in Ohio Rev. Code §109.25 (1953). It is self-evident that any
failure to so join the Attorney General could result only from lack of
knowledge or a misapprehension of its terms, as any judgment rendered
in such a proceeding is void, unenforceable, and may be set aside upon
motion of the Attorney General, unless that official was served with
process.
The Attorney General's office has not as yet put forth a particular
effort to secure the biennial reports required by the Act," yet many
such written reports are received daily. The charitable trust division
will, undoubtedly, find it desirable to call this requirement to the at-
tention of those trustees who have registered trusts but have not at
this time filed a report for the preceding two years. This section of
the Act has been interpreted as requiring an accounting to be filed at
the close of a two-year period from the date of registration and each
two years thereafter.
It can be said that the attitude of trustees and counsel toward the
Act has appeared to be favorable. As must be true with any new ad-
ministrative procedure established by legislation, there have been ad-
justments to be made both by trustees and the office of the Attorney
General. It has also been necessary to establish certain informal prin-
ciples or rules for the guidance of the charitable trust division in the
procedural problems incidental to the administration of the Act in order
to attain uniformity; this, necessarily, involved making unofficial inter-
pretations of certain provisions of the statutes.
As the Charitable Trusts Act has been in effect only since October,
1953, it follows that experience in administering the Act is still some-
what limited, but during this period the Attorney General's office has
found that courts, trustees and counsel alike have been most cooperative
in working toward an effective administration of the Act.
27 Ohio Rev. Code §109.30 (1953).
28 Ohio Rev. Code §109.31 (1953).
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IV. EVALUATION OF THE ACT IN OPERATION AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
It may be that before attempting any evaluation of the Charitable
Trusts Act as it was enacted and now exists, it should be stated clearly
that the Attorney General was active in bringing to the attention of the
General Assembly the urgent need for such constructive charitable trust
legislation. The Attorney General also assumed leadership in pointing
out specific problems toward which any such enactment should be di-
rected and suggesting possible solutions; the present Act incorporates
many of these suggestions. It must, then, be candidly admitted that any
attempt to evaluate the Act cannot be completely free from prejudice.
With this preface, attention should be turned to the Act itself to
determine what have appeared to be some of the strong and the rather
weak or ambiguous spots in this legislation.
The definition section, 29 which has been quoted in full earlier in
this discussion, presents practical problems in interpretation and adminis-
tration. The section provides in part:
As used in Sections 109.23 to 109.33, inclusive, of the
Revised Code, "charitable trust" means any fiduciary relation-
ship with respect to property arising as a result of a manifesta-
tion of intention to create it, and subjecting the partnership,
corporation, person, or association of persons by whom the
property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property
for any charitable, religious or educational purpose . . . Such
sections do not apply to charitable, religious and educational
institutions holding funds in trust or otherwise exclusively
for their own purposes
The foregoing quotation shows clearly that the statute provides
for an exemption from the Act which could be read as practically co-
extensive with the definition itself. Use of the word "institution" has
increased the confusion, as the Supreme Court of Ohio has, as recently
as 1954, said that, for the purpose of exemption from inheritance tax,
an institution for public charitable purposes is established upon the dis-
tribution to trustees for public, charitable, or educational purposes of the
fund given in trust for such use.
30
The Attorney General, for registration purposes, has adopted the
interpretation that "institutions" is synonymous with "corporations." This
office has followed the policy, in accordance with that interpretation,
that non-profit corporations need not register funds which they hold
exclusively for their general corporate purposes, whether held for all
such purposes or for only one or more corporate purpose.
It must be that this is the sense in which this term was used by the
legislature in enacting the Charitable Trusts Act. This belief may, it is
admitted, be based in part upon the premise that any other interpretation
29 Ohio Rev. Code §109.23 (1953).
3o In re Estate of Oglebay, 162 Ohio St. 1 (1954), and cases cited therein.
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would go far toward rendering the entire Act nugatory, which certainly
could not lead to the intended result. In reaching this conclusion, how-
ever, resort has been had to the comparable section of the New Hamp-
shire law8 ' governing charitable trusts, which excludes from the oper-
ation of the law charitable corporations holding property or funds for
their corporate purposes. It should also be noted here that the Rhode
Island legislation 32 exempts from the operation of the charitable trust
legislation charitable, religious, and educational institutions holding funds
in trust exclusively for their own charter or corporate purposes and
that the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act 3
excludes charitable corporations organized and operated exclusively for
educational, religious, or hospital purposes.
The following exclusion, also found in Ohio Rev. Code § 109.23
(1953), should, perhaps, also be re-examined:
There are excluded from this definition and from the
operation of such sections, trusts until such time as the charita-
ble, religious or educational purpose expressed in such trust
becomes vested in use or enjoyment.
This language does not present the difficulties of analysis that
accompany the exemption of the charitable, religious, and educational
institutions from the Act, but serious consideration could be given to
the scope of the language.
It is freely conceded that it may be desirable to exempt from the
registration requirement of the Act, both charitable corporations holding
funds for their general corporate purposes and trusts in which there is
no present charitable use or enjoyment of the trust fund. But legislative
thinking should be directed toward the extent of the present language
excluding both such corporations and trusts from the operation of the
entire Act. Should not the vast amounts of funds so held be specifically
subjected to all provisions of the Act except possibly registration? The
language now appearing in the section, if interpreted literally, would
seem to free from any powers of the Attorney General all of the vast
sums now held by charitable corporations in trust, if not on a technical
charitable trust, for corporate purposes and that held in trust by any
trustees, ultimately to be used for charitable purposes, although no
charitable use is now being made of either income or principal.
That such widespread exclusion was not intended is clearly ap-
parent; the Act itself provides that the Attorney General is "in addition
to all his common law and statutory powers" 34 to prepare and maintain
31N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §7:21 (1955).
32 Rhode Island Acts and Resolves, January, 1950, c. 2617, as amended
January, 1951, c. 2852.
33 Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act, §3, Hand-
book of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1954-,
p. 169.
34 Ohio Rev. Code §109.26 (1953).
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a register of charitable trusts. Then, too, the legislature has, aside from
the enactment of the Charitable Trusts Act, shown its awareness of the
role of the Attorney General in protecting public interests in relation to
charitable funds.
3 5
It is hardly conceivable that there could have been an intention to
diminish in any way the inherent common law powers and duties of the
Attorney General relative to charitable trusts. The charitable trust di-
vision has, conversely, assumed that the Act served only to broaden and
strengthen those powers. As yet, Ohio Rev. Code §109.23 (1953), has
not received judicial interpretation resolving the problems suggested here.
Ohio Rev. Code §109.25 (1953), set out in full in footnote 18,
also, it is believed, could be clarified in some respects. The charitable
trust division has proceeded on the assumption that the language making
the Attorney General a necessary party in all proceedings the object of
which is "to construe the provision of an instrument with respect to a
charitable trust" should be interpreted broadly. It has, therefore, been
the general policy of the division, when advice is sought, to suggest that
the Attorney General be made a party in any action which, although
rather remotely, affects a charitable trust. Under this interpretation,
the Attorney General is a necessary party in any will construction or
declaratory judgment action in which the will or other instrument under
,consideration creates or purports to create a charitable trust.
It seems to be beyond controversy that a charitable trust can be
effectively destroyed in an action which does not directly involve the
validity or the construction of the trust provision itself; the determination
of such a case may readily decrease or even entirely deplete the fund
designated for charitable purposes. It appears that the public interest
should be as actively represented in such cases as in those where the
trust itself is the point on which the litigation turns.
It has been held by a court of common pleas36 that Ohio Rev. Code
§ 109.25 (1953), does not make the Attorney General such a necessary
party in an action to contest a will that the court lacked jurisdiction be-
cause of the failure to join the Attorney General as a party defendant.
A motion to dismiss was overruled, the court finding that "the object ' 13 7
of the proceeding was to determine whether or not a certain paper
35 Ohio Rev. Code §2307.131 (1953), provides that in any action in which a
charitable trust not in being is a beneficiary of any future interest in any property,
the Attorney General shall represent such interest; Ohio Rev. Code §2109.34
(1953), provides for representation by the Attorney General of beneficiaries of
certain charitable trusts in a hearing on a fiduciary's account; and Ohio Rev.
Code §1702.49 (1953), provides for making the Attorney General a party in an
action brought to secure court direction for the distribution of the assets of a
-charitable corporation.
36 Spang v. Cleveland Trust Co., 73 Ohio L. Abs. 164 (1956), Ohio Bar, Vol.
XXIX, No. 33, August 13, 1956.
37 Ohio Rev. Code §109.25 (1953).
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writing was or was not the last will and testament of the testatrix and
was not, at least primarily, to terminate a charitable trust. A court of
appeals,38 however, has interpreted Ohio Rev. Code §109.25 (1953),
as making the Attorney General a necessary party in a will construction
action where a charitable trust is involved. The court, in so holding,
referred to the words "with respect to a charitable trust" and concluded
that the construction of the will would affect the amount passing in
trust under the residuary clause.
The Attorney General is, by the same section, specifically authorized
to intervene in any proceeding affecting a charitable trust, and is directed
to so do when requested by the court having jurisdiction of the action.
These are certainly salutary provisions.
It is also suggested that Ohio Rev. Code §109.25 (1953), could be
given consideration from the viewpoint of authorizing- the Attorney
General to waive service of process or summons and voluntarily enter
an appearance in actions affecting charitable trusts. If such authorization
appeared in the Act the Attorney General could then cooperate with
counsel by following this procedure; doubt as to its advisability now
stems from the language used by the General Assembly providing that
judgments "in such proceedings without service of process upon the
Attorney General shall be void, unenforceable, and shall be set aside
upon the Attorney General's motion seeking such relief."
As must be true with any relatively new legislation, there are
minor, in fact, probably relatively unimportant, questions which appear
as experience is gained in administering the law. Some of these, toward
which legislative thinking might be directed, are: Does the rule making
power granted to the Attorney General 9 embrace only those functions
pertaining to the register of charitable trusts? Do the required biennial
reports4 ° become part of the register itself within the meaning of the
section providing that the register shall be open to public inspection for
such legitimate purposes as the Attorney General may determine? 41
Should it not be the clerk of the court of common pleas, rather than
the judge thereof, 42 who should furnish such copies of papers and
information as the Attorney General may require?
The foregoing remarks are in no way intended as an attack upon
the Ohio Charitable Trusts Act; they are merely suggestions as to areas
toward which the thinking of the legislators and members of the bar
might be directed.
The Charitable Trusts Act, it is submitted, is constructive and
forward-looking legislation. It can result in immeasurable good in the
38 Blair v. Bouton, Court of Appeals for Knox County, No. 503, decided
Nov. 13, 1956.
39 Ohio Rev. Code §109.27 (1953).
40 Ohio Rev. Code §109.31 (1953).
41 Ohio Rev. Code §109.28 (1953).
42 Ohio Rev. Code §109.29 (1953).
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fields of the administration of charitable trusts and the protection of the
public for whose benefit these trusts are created. It is believed that it
has resulted in such benefits although it is still very new. Final judg-
ment of the effectiveness of the Charitable Trusts Act must, however,
depend upon its effective administration and the continuing unqualified
cooperation of trustees, attorneys and the courts.
